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The Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise at the University of Maryland’s 
School of Public Policy provides the strategic linkage between the public and private 
sector to develop and improve solutions to increasingly complex problems associated 
with the delivery of public services—a responsibility increasingly shared by both sectors. 
Operating at the nexus of public and private interests, the Center researches, develops, 
and promotes best practices; develops policy recommendations; and strives to impact 
senior decision-makers toward improved government and industry results.  
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The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) is a wheeled, agile, rocket and 
guided missile launcher for which logistics and sustainment are provided through a 
public-private partnership (PPP) between the U.S. Army and Lockheed Martin. The 
HIMARS program relies on a performance-based logistics (PBL) strategy that ensures 
the cost-effective delivery of specified performance outcomes.  Since its inception the 
HIMARS PBL has consistently met or exceeded cost and performance objectives, having 
twice received the Secretary of Defense Performance-Based Logistics Award, which 
recognizes government and industry teams that provide warfighters with superior 
operational capability.  
Given current and anticipated budgetary constraints, the DoD must heighten its focus on 
affordability. At the same time, new threats demand superior technology that is highly-
reliable. To a large extent, these twin objectives—reduced costs and better 
performance—can be achieved through the wider implementation of the PBL approach.  
Unfortunately, however, PBL contracting is not being aggressively pursued across the 
DoD.  
In most cases, PBL contracts are multi-year agreements (typically 5-15 years, plus 
options) according to which the chosen contractor manages a given system’s supply 
chain. These long-term partnerships with industry often leverage commercial best 
practices in the key performance areas of availability, reliability, logistics footprint, and 
cost.  The HIMARS exemplifies the attributes of a successful PBL program. It is 
therefore instructive to examine the program’s history, structure, and specific features in 
order that future weapon systems programs might benefit by adopting a similar approach. 
The HIMARS vehicle comprises a launcher pod of six rockets that are loaded onto the 
bed of the vehicle. The front of the system is fitted with a fully enclosed and armored 
cab, which provides protection against small arms fire. The HIMARS can be loaded onto 
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cargo jets, including the C-130, and thus can be deployed to areas that were previously 
inaccessible to heavier launchers.  
Per the program’s performance-based agreement, the HIMARS PBL program measures 
performance in the following areas: system status readiness; average response time for 
critical non-mission-capable launcher failures in the continental United States and outside 
the continental United States; average repair time in the field; and average depot repair 
turnaround time (DoD, 2006). Note the relative simplicity of these requirements, which 
facilitated straightforward monitoring and, thus, complete transparency. 
The Army awarded the first HIMARS PBL contract to Lockheed Martin in the amount of 
$96 million in February 2004 (Lockheed Martin, 2004). The four-year contract, referred 
to as Life Cycle Contractor Support (LCCS) ended in December 2007. Given its 
increasing inventory of HIMARS, the existence of a successful partnership between the 
Army and Lockheed Martin, and the cost benefits that derive from economies of scale, 
the Marines sought to support its launchers through LCCS upon completion of the initial 
contract. Accordingly, the second contract (LCCS II), a three-year contract worth $90 
million, was awarded in January 2008 to support both the Army and Marines’ systems.  
By 2011, Lockheed Martin was supporting 620 Army and Marines fielded mobile 
launcher systems—396 HIMARS and 224 MLRS M270A1—via “firm-fixed price with 
incentive fee” contracts for stateside operations and “cost-plus fixed fee” contracts for 
overseas contingency operations (Gardener, 2008). A third contract, in the amount of 
$158 million, termed Life Cycle Launcher Support (LCLS), extended HIMARS 
sustainment through December 2013 for services, and through December 2014 for 
hardware. 
The LCCS/LCLS program is headquartered in Dallas, where numerous program 
functions are executed, including program management, depot repair coordination, 
inventory control, contracting with suppliers, design interface, and database maintenance 
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(Lockheed Martin, 2013). The database tracks the location of each launcher, including 
each spare part, indicated whether the part is functional, and provides its status with 
regard to the repair process.  
There are also 26 field service representatives (FSRs) that operate from 22 locations, 
eight of which are overseas. In-theater maintenance work is performed by soldiers, with 
the assistance of these FSRs (Hawkins, 2009). Given the level of sophistication provided 
by Lockheed Martin’s database and logistics networks, the FSRs are able to streamline 
and simplify the repair process for launchers. In fact, soldiers operating the system in 
theater need only remove and replace defective components. Perhaps one of the greatest 
benefits is the provision of limited depot-level repair capability at each battalion, where 
repair work is provided by the FSR. Referred to as the capability to “Fix Forward,” some 
50% of HIMARS repairs are performed on location by the FSRs, eliminating wait times 
and significantly reducing costs. This in-the-field repair capability has also significantly 
improved deployed launcher availability.  
Over the course of the last decade, The HIMARS PBL has repeatedly achieved and 
exceeded the performance requirements. Success was achieved early on. In submitting its 
list of critical accomplishments for consideration by the DoD Awards Program in 
Performance-Based Logistics in 2006, the HIMARs Program Office noted that Lockheed 
Martin earned the maximum incentive fee each quarter for having achieved 99% plus 
system readiness for every contract quarter (DoD, 2006).    
Lockheed Martin’s LCCS program has also initiated a robust obsolescence management 
strategy early on in order to ensure that it could meet performance requirements (DoD, 
2006).  The LCCS program regularly monitors the Government-Industry Data Exchange 
Program in order to identify potential obsolescence issues. Within the first couple of 
years of the PBL, LCCS team recognized the potential for the obsolescence of numerous 
components, identified alternate parts, and supported specific redesign efforts (DoD, 
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2006). Although a natural extension of the PBL strategy, obsolescence management has 
proven challenging under other contracting or in-house arrangements. 
The LCCS II contract required that system readiness be maintained at or above 90% and 
that response time be below 48, 72, or 96 hours for U.S. based operations, depending on 
the nature of the problem, 92%, 91%, and 90% of the time, respectively (DoD, 2009). For 
overseas operations, the response time had to be below 96, 120, or 144 hours (DoD, 
2009). The program consistently achieved these objectives at the required percentages in 
all performance areas. As a result, the LCCS team won its second Secretary of Defense 
Performance-Based Logistics Award in 2009. 
In addition, the program also tracks reliability, monitoring the mean time between system 
aborts (MTBSA) and mean time between essential function failure (MTBEFF). The 
HIMARS program’s reliability far exceeds the Army’s required performance goals.  
The HIMARS experience makes it clear that when properly implemented, PBL strategies 
can result in reduced costs and continuously-improving performance. The HIMARS PBL 
strategy worked to ensure that incentives were carefully structured and aligned with the 
performance requirements of the system. With the incentives aligned, integration between 
the provider and customer was readily achieved. The support provider, appropriately 
empowered, was able to work to improve logistics efficiency, improve performance, 
reduce costs, and make reliability improvements that reduce life cycle costs; resulting in a 






We have identified a number of the HIMARS program’s attributes which we believe can 
inform future PBL programs, thereby helping to ensure their success:  
Alignment of contractor incentives with performance requirements. 
It is critical that the PBL incentives be carefully structured and aligned with the 
performance requirements of the system.  With the incentives aligned, integration 
between the provider and customer is generally improved.   
Clearly-defined performance metrics  
Performance metrics, rooted in a performance-based agreement, provides a clear and 
objective way to measure the progress of the support provider.  
A total life-cycle systems management perspective 
A life-cycle based perspective will improve reliability and maintainability, and better 
manage costs.   
Supply chain management  
Material support is a critical link in the supportability of weapon systems.  The best 
skilled labor, advanced technology, and performance mean little without the “right 
part, at the right place, at the right time.”   
Public-Private Partnerships  
It is essential to achieve the right public-private mix for each program, with clearly 
defined and measurable expectations.  In addition to satisfying the statutory 
requirements, using the strengths of the organic and contractor organizations can 
provide a better logistics solution.  
ix 
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Operational requirements and funding pressures are driving the need for logistics 
transformation. PBLs often require government organizations to shift their focus and to 
perform tasks that are different from their traditional tasks. Needless-to-say, a successful 
logistics transformation will require a sustained leadership commitment to change the 
existing culture and have it embrace the new organizational role required for successful 




The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) is a wheeled, agile, rocket and 
guided missile launcher for which logistics and sustainment are provided through a 
public-private partnership (PPP) between the U.S. Army and Lockheed Martin. The 
HIMARS product support relies on a performance-based logistics (PBL) strategy that 
ensures the cost-effective delivery of specified performance outcomes. Under this 
arrangement, Lockheed Martin provides the fire control system, the launcher loader 
modules, and full system support. This program has demonstrated how an appropriately 
structured PBL contract can increase system performance, while reducing sustainment 
costs. 
Since its inception, the HIMARS PBL has consistently met or exceeded cost and 
performance objectives, having twice received the Secretary of Defense Performance-
Based Logistics Award, which recognizes government and industry teams that provide 
warfighters with superior operational capability. In fact, HIMARS is the only two-time 
recipient of this award. The HIMARS, supported by this PBL contract, has also proven 
itself on the battlefield, playing an integral role in Operation Iraqi Freedom and other 
overseas contingency operations.  
Unfortunately, however, PBL contracting is not being aggressively pursued across the 
DoD. Meanwhile, operations and maintenance (O&M) costs are a leading driver of the 
DoD’s budgetary challenges (see Figure 1). In fact, the average total cost of O&M per 
troop nearly doubled to $115,000 in 2012, compared with $58,000 in 2001 (Korb, 
Rothman, & Hoffman, 2012). What is more, these costs are increasing against a backdrop 
of shrinking defense budgets. 
At the national level, the U.S. deficit is projected to exceed the nation’s GDP by the early 
2020s (Congressional Budget Office, 2013). In fact, it is projected that mandatory federal 
spending (on healthcare, social security, income security programs, federal and military 
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retirement benefits, and veterans’ benefits) and interest payments will exhaust the entire 
federal budget by 2036 if current trends in spending and demographics continue (Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 2013). 
Figure 1. The DoD’s costs (2013 billions of dollars) by appropriation category (CBO, 2013) 
The fact that total defense spending (in real terms) was higher in 2010 than at any point 
since the end of World War II suggests to critics that the military could further decrease 
the number of troops and reduce the scope of acquisitions. At present, however, with the 
projected cuts, the active military force structure will be at near post-Cold War lows (see 
Figure 2), and existing equipment inventories are becoming older, smaller, and less 




Figure 2. Total active duty military end strength (1988-2012)  
Note. The information in this graph came from CSIS, 2013. 
 
It is within this challenging environment that the DoD must seek to reduce its operations 
and maintenance costs, which will increase to close to $200 billion by 2015 (DoD, 2014; 
see Figure 3). Weapons sustainment is a significant driver of these costs. For instance, the 
DoD will request over $14 billion to fund depot maintenance in FY 2015, which is $986 
million (7%) more than the amount spent in the previous year (DoD, 2014). Properly-
implemented PBL strategies have the potential to reduce these and other sustainment-
related costs.  
Given current and anticipated budgetary constraints, the DoD must heighten its focus on 
affordability. At the same time, new threats (e.g. cyber-espionage, a rising China, and a 
chaotic Middle East) demand superior technology that is highly-reliable. To a large 























































































through the wider implementation of the PBL approach. Such was the case with the 
HIMARS program. 
 
Figure 3. DoD base budget by appropriation title (DoD, 2014) 
PBL programs are designed to increase weapon system readiness at lower costs relative 
to traditional sustainment strategies. Given the success of the HIMARS, it is instructive 
to examine the program’s history, structure, and specific features in order that future 






II. The HIMARS System 
HIMARS was designed to meet the requirement for a lighter, more deployable, mobile 
rocket launcher that can be sent virtually anywhere in order to provide lethal, long-range 
fires. HIMARS was specifically designed to support the Army’s Entry Contingency 
forces and its Light/Airborne/Air Assault Divisions with long-range, general support, 
rocket and missile indirect fires (“XM142,” 2008). 
A Brief History 
Modern mobile rocketry systems have a history dating back to World War II. In the 
1930s and 40s, Russia and Germany developed simple launchers designed for mobility 
and a wide range, marking a shift away from traditional “tube” artillery. The Germans 
first developed simple launchers using inspiration from the Nebelwerfer, or smoke 
projector. The Russians furthered the concept by mounting it on the back of trucks 
(Dugdale-Pointon, 2002). The Russians then continued to develop this cheap and 
effective system, referred to as the General Support Rocket System (GSRS) weapon, for 
client states. The first, and most famous of these self-propelled multiple rocket systems, 
was nicknamed the Katyushas. Following its success in World War II, the GSRS was 
used in several conflicts, including Vietnam and Korea (Dugdale-Pointon, 2002).  
 
BM-13N Katyusha on a Studebaker US6 truck 
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In the 1980s, western countries, including the United States, further adapted the system. 
The U.S. relied on an upgraded version of the GSRS in 1983 during the Gulf War. 
Whereas the Katyushas consisted of a rack of launch rails mounted to the back of a truck, 
the American system used advanced targeting and GPS systems, allowing “targets to be 
engaged without multiple aiming points” (“MLRS”, 2014, p. 1). Still, the system had 
shortcomings; accuracy and range were limited. Thus, its use was restricted to targets in 
open terrain where collateral damage could be contained. Its range—31.5 kilometers—
would soon be surpassed by many foreign multiple-rocket launchers (MRLs; “MLRS”, 
2014). 
After upgrading launcher responsiveness and enhancing the range and precision, the 
GSRS was reintroduced during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 under a new name, the 
Multiple Launcher Rocket System (MLRS). The improved MLRS was designed to fire 
more warheads at a faster pace and a further distance (“MLRS”, 2014). Its deployment in 
Operation Desert Storm was to be the new system’s first field test. The first combat 
launch consisted of ten armored vehicles firing more than 100 rockets in a minute 
(Lockheed Martin, n.d.).  The system’s accuracy and power compelled Iraqi troops to 
remain in their bunkers, allowing U.S. forces to capture enemy positions.  
 
The MLRS deployed in Desert Storm  
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While the MLRS performed well during Operation Desert Storm, its rockets and 
submunitions raised concerns. Many of the Iraqi artillery still outranged the American 
rockets and the MLRS submunitions’ high dud rate led to questions over the safety of 
soldiers and noncombatants (“MLRS”, 2014). In an attempt to address these issues, the 
HIMARS was developed to complement the existing MLRS family of mobile rocket 
systems. 
System Description  
The HIMARS is a highly-mobile weapons platform that provides lethal, long-range firing 
capability. It is a 24-hour, all-weather system that can aim at a target in 16 seconds 
(Lockheed Martin, 2008). This wheeled, agile rocket and guided missile system is a 
lighter, transportable version of the legacy M-270 MLRS, described previously.  
 
The M142 HIMARS  
 
The HIMARS vehicle comprises a launcher pod of six rockets that are loaded onto the 
bed of the vehicle.  The front of the system is fitted with a fully enclosed and armored 
cab, which provides protection against small arms fire. The HIMARS can be loaded onto 
cargo jets, including the C-130, and thus can be deployed to areas that were previously 
inaccessible to heavier launchers (Hamilton, 2011). It is highly transportable, owing to its 
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wheeled chassis and lighter weight. The 6-pack of rockets in the HIMARS weights about 
24,000 pounds, which is lighter than the MLRS’s 12 rockets, which weigh in at 44,000 
pounds (Baker, 2003).  
The HIMARS fire control system has video, keyboard control, one gigabyte of program 
storage and a global positioning system (“HIMARS”, 2014). In addition, the system 
incorporates self-loading, autonomous features and is capable of firing either six MLRS 
series rockets or one Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile. The HIMARS 
fire control system, electronics, and communications units are all interchangeable with 
the existing M270A1 launcher (DoD, 2006). Further, the HIMARS is capable of firing 
any rocket or missile in the MLRS family of munitions (Baker, 2003). The similarities 
between the HIMARS and MLRS extend to user instruction: the training of the three-
soldier crew remains the same for both systems. Further, the HIMARS is capable of 
firing any rocket or missile in the MLRS family of munitions (Baker, 2003).  
 
The HIMARS inside of a C-130.  
HIMARS Acquisition 
In 1996 Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control developed the HIMARS under an 
advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) program. The program’s objective 
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was to ensure that the HIMARS could “engage and defeat artillery, air defense 
concentrations, trucks, light armor and personnel carriers, and support troop and supply 
concentrations” (“HIMARS”, 2011).  
In December 1999, Lockheed Martin produced the initial prototype. In October 2000 a 
total of 18 extended range MLRS rockets were successfully launched from this system at 
the White Sands testing facility (“XM142”, 2008). Following successful completion of 
the Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) in April 2002, Lockheed received a 
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract from both the U.S. Army and the Marine 
Corps in March 2003. The U.S. Army signed a contract for 89 launchers, the Marine 
Corps for four. A second LRIP contract was awarded in January 2004 for 26 additional 
launchers (“HIMARS”, 2014). 
HIMARS successfully completed the initial operational test and evaluation in November 
2004 following their use during Operation Iraqi Freedom. A third LRIP contract was 
awarded in January 2005 for 38 additional launchers (“HIMARS”, 2014). After final 
testing concluded, HIMARS entered regular service in June 2005 with the 27th Field 
Artillery, 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with the first full-rate 
production contract awarded in December 2005 (“HIMARS”, 2014).! 
In March 2006 Lockheed Martin was awarded a contract totaling $51.5 million for 18 
HIMARS launchers (“HIMARS”, 2014).  
Following this, the US Army and Marine Corps awarded Lockheed Martin a contract for 
another 44 and 16 HIMARS systems respectively in January 2007 (“HIMARS”, 2014). 
Lockheed Marine began full-rate production in Camden, Arkansas in April and the first 
Marine Corps battalion, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment, was equipped with 
HIMARS and deployed to Iraq in July (“HIMARS”, 2014).  
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HIMARS completed 255 out of 257 dry-fire missions and 17 out of 17 live-fire missions 
for a 99.2% and 100% success rate, respectively, in 2008 (“XM142”, 2008). This success 
rate was reported in the Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) report to the congress in 
March 2008. The following year, in January 2009, a contract for 57 launchers for the 
Army and several launchers for the Marine Corps was placed (Army-technology, 2014).  
In January 2011 Lockheed Martin signed a $139.6 million contract with the Army to 
provide 44 combat-proven HIMARS, thus increasing the launcher fleet to 375 with 
deliveries continuing through January 2013 (Lockheed Martin, 2011). The Army and 
Lockheed Martin celebrated the delivery of the 400th HIMARS in September 2011, the 
Army received 300 launchers while the Marine Corps received delivery of 100 




III. Performance Based Logistics 
Over the last decade, the DoD has focused on reducing the cost of weapons system 
development, in addition to the products and services that it purchases, by crafting more 
sophisticated contracts with more favorable terms for the government (Butler, 2013). In 
addition, the services are increasingly diverting their attention to sustainment costs— 
which are continuing to increase across the DoD— in part because systems are aging 
more rapidly because the services cannot afford to buy replacements.  
The DoD has identified PBL as its preferred approach to supporting weapon system 
logistics. PBL contracting, when used appropriately, can reduce sustainment costs 
relative to traditional, organic approaches. PBL is a logistics support solution that 
transfers inventory management, technical support, and the supply chain function to a 
provider who guarantees a level of performance at the same or reduced cost.  Instead of 
buying spares, repairs, tools, and data in individual transactions, PBL entails the purchase 
of a predetermined level of availability that meets the warfighter’s objectives.   
A History of Success 
In most cases, PBL contracts are multi-year agreements (typically with options that can 
extend the contracts for 5 to 15 years) according to which the chosen contractor manages 
a given system’s supply chain. Whereas traditional sustainment contracts incentivize the 
provider to sell parts, PBL’s “pay for performance” approach motivates the provider to 
reduce failures and resource consumption. These long-term partnerships with industry 
often leverage commercial best practices, and there is ample empirical data that 
demonstrates that PBL produces desired outcomes in the key performance areas of 
availability, reliability, logistics footprint, and cost.   
Major systems including the C-17, F/A-18, and AH-64 helicopter have all reduced 
sustainment costs by hundreds of millions of dollars, while other systems and subsystems 
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such as the F-22, UH-60 avionics, and F-404 engine have seen drastic improvement in 
availability and cycle time, i.e. logistics response and repair turnaround; (Fowler, 2009). 
Other government reports (e.g. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009) and think-tank 
studies conclude that PBL offers distinct benefits that are difficult to achieve using 
traditional approaches.  
The PBL Model 
PBL’s economic model incentivizes manufacturers and suppliers to innovate and reduce 
total system and life cycle costs by making investments in improved reliability.  
There are three typical components of the PBL contract pricing structure: 
• Share-in-savings to incentivize provider to lower overall sustainment costs 
• Incentive fee to reward provider for meeting performance expectations, and 
• Annual fixed-price or fixed-price per operating hour contract schedule to provide 




Figure 4. Spectrum of PBL strategies (Defense Acquisition University, 2005) 
Figure 4 illustrates how the DoD and private industry can partner and share the support 

















(the DoD) and contractor support (private industry) to meet sustainment strategy 
objectives. The allocations of support responsibilities are often based on factors such as 
the age of the system, existing support infrastructure, organic and commercial capabilities 
and legislative and regulatory constraints. The goals of PBL contracts are to provide the 
U.S. military with a higher level of logistics efficiency and effectiveness; to improve 
accountability; and to promote the development of more reliable products. Based on the 
experience of the private sector and the pilot programs conducted in the DoD, it is widely 
believed that PBL support offers the best approach for long-term support of weapon 
systems, and their subsystems (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2006). 
When implemented, PBL shifts the focus of the government’s efforts from transactions to 
identifying performance outcomes and assigning responsibilities. The objective is to 
develop accountability, instead of relying on control. With PBL, active management of 
the sustainment process (e.g. forecasting demand, maintaining inventory, and scheduling 
repairs [see Figure 5]) becomes the responsibility of the support provider. Additionally, it 
changes the incentives for the supplier. The supplier, with a properly structured PBL 
program, is now incentivized to improve the reliability of systems, and reduce inventories 
of spare parts; and with fewer repairs made and fewer parts sold, the contractor stands to 
make more profit.  While from the government’s perspective, PBL results in optimizing 
total system availability; and, at the same time, minimizes the cost and the logistics 




Figure 5. A reengineering tool to improve readiness through reliability (Naval Supply 
Systems Command, 2005) 
 
Advantages of PBL 
PBL programs rely on commercial sector supply chains which are fully-integrated, end-
to-end, systems. Unfortunately, comparable systems do not exist within the DoD .The 
DoD’s traditional approach has been fragmented, with segmented accountability and 
control by various stakeholders (Defense Logistics Agency, services, and depots) all of 
which have their own budget requirements and restrictions, and different priorities.  
Additionally, the responsibility for the elements of logistics has been shared between 
acquisition activities and sustainment activities. Traditional logistics metrics are focused 
on internal logistics processes, and rarely have a direct relationship to warfighter 
requirements. Moreover, efforts to optimize these elements often results in sub-optimal 
results at the system level (Devries, 2004). 
Additionally, traditional logistics support dictates processes and design specifications, 
which has the effect of restricting innovation and process improvements. Suppliers and 
equipment manufacturers are also incentivized to sell more repair parts, versus 
developing and implementing reliability improvements. As a result of these factors, it is 
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difficult to provide truly cost-effective, integrated logistics support using the DoD’s 
traditional model.   
There is no doubt that the DoD must move away from its traditional hierarchical 
command and control structure towards a more adaptive system that will provide the 
precise, agile support required for the distributed, network-centric operations that the 
DoD envisions. Thus, the DoD must fully embrace PBL, in order to continue to take 
advantage of world-class supply chains. 
In addition to the logistics benefits, there are four distinct advantages associated with the 
use of PBL contracting. These advantages are summarized below. 
Delineates outcome performance goal  
The objective of PBL programs is to buy measurable outcomes based on warfighter 
performance requirements. These requirements should consist of a few simple, realistic, 
consistent, and easily quantifiable metrics focused on operational performance and value-
added process indicators. These metrics can then be linked, through the contract vehicle, 
to supplier incentives. 
Ensures responsibilities are assigned. 
A PBL effectively transfers most of the risk and the responsibility for supply chain 
management from the customer to the supplier for the system, subsystem, or component 
that is managed. For example, pre-PBL, the DoD customer did not have the visibility to 
make financially-sound decisions, given the many “silos” associated with the full 
spectrum of the traditional supply chain management (e.g. acquisition, engineering, 
procurement, comptroller, and logistics).  With a PBL contract, the customer understands 
the true cost of the support, rendering his financial forecasts and budgets much more 
accurate. Additionally, the PBL metrics, when properly developed, define the suppliers’ 
responsibilities very clearly. For example, part or system availability is unambiguous. For 
instance, if the contract calls for the delivery of a part within 48 hours, to be achieved 95 
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percent of the time, then it is evident to all whether or not the supplier is meeting its 
obligation (Keating & Huff, 2005).   
Reduces cost of ownership 
PBL programs, when properly implemented, will reduce the cost of ownership of DoD 
weapon systems, while improving readiness. This reduction results from the decline in 
inventories, improved supply chain efficiency, replacement of low-reliability 
components, and increased system availability.    
Provides incentives for attaining performance goal 
Each PBL initiative should be unique and tailored to its program, and should strive to be 
a “win-win” for both the customer and the supplier. The PBL program should 
fundamentally align the interest of the supplier with that of the customer, and lead 
suppliers to assume greater responsibility for providing ongoing improvements to their 
products. PBL provides incentives for the supplier to improve design and processes and 
implement commercial best practices (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2006).  
Decline in PBL Contracting  
Recently, the Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L), Frank Kendall, directed acquisition 
officials to renew their pursuit of performance-based approaches to system sustainment 
and maintenance. Given its history of success, it is unclear why PBL is not being 
aggressively pursued across the DoD. According to the consulting firm, Deloitte, the 
DoD could realize cost savings in the area of $20 billion by transitioning current support 
contracts to PBL (“Performance-based Logistics Promises Savings”, 2014).  
In 2005, there were more than 200 PBL contracts in place within the DoD (Gansler, 
Lucyshyn, Harrington, & Corl), with spending on PBL projects having more than tripled 
since their inception — from $1.4 billion in 2001 to $5.0 billion in 2009. Yet by 2013, 
the number of PBL contracts had dropped to 87 (Irwin, 2013), while total DoD 
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sustainment costs continued to increase. It is unclear what has prompted this precipitous 
drop in PBL contracting. Joe Chenelle, managing director at Accenture, a consulting 
firm, posits that the DoD has become suspicious that suppliers are making excessive 
profits. He points to the lack of visibility inherent in PBL contracting, and suggests that 
DoD managers prefer to control costs through the use of transactional sustainment 
approaches. Given today’s budget realities, the DoD must be willing to relinquish some 
control in exchange for lower overall costs and better performance.  
PBL Challenges 
Critics suggest, perhaps rightly, that PBL arrangements can be more challenging to 
develop and manage than other contract types. Just as an appropriate PBL program 
structure aligns the incentives of the customer (the government) and the support provider, 
leading to a win-win scenario, an inappropriate structure can create perverse incentives, 
and result in undesired or unintended consequences. Again, a successful PBL program 
relies on performance metrics that are straightforward, measurable, and achievable. 
Moreover, these metrics must be carefully developed and implemented, monitored, and 
evaluated. The performance-based agreement between the user and the program office 
should specify a range of support to accommodate changing priorities and resources 
availability, adding flexibility to the derived metrics.  
A successful PBL program requires continuous communication between the program 
office and the support provider, during both the negotiation and the execution of the PBL 
contract. These communications will enable the necessary mutual understanding of scope 
that must occur for successful implementation of the contract.  
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IV. The HIMARS PBL 
The Army awarded the first HIMARS PBL contract to Lockheed Martin in the amount of 
$96 million in February 2004 (Lockheed Martin, 2004). The four-year contract, referred 
to as Life Cycle Contractor Support (LCCS) ended in December 2007. At this point, the 
Army had acquired 195 HIMARS; the Marines had acquired 40. Given its increasing 
inventory of HIMARS, the existence of a successful partnership between the Army and 
Lockheed Martin, and the cost benefits that derive from economies of scale, the Marines 
sought to support its launchers through LCCS upon completion of the initial contract.  
Accordingly, the second contract (LCCS II), a three-year contract worth $90 million, was 
awarded in January 2008 to support both the Army and Marines’ systems. The shorter 
duration of LCCS II reflected significant risk associated with unknown launcher 
production quantities and price fluctuations for component spares (Gardner, 2008).  
The LCCS contracts entrusted Lockheed Martin with the full support responsibilities for 
the performance-based product support of the HIMARS and MLRS M270A1 launchers' 
fire control systems, as well as the HIMARS launcher-loader module (Lockheed Martin, 
2014). The commonality of support for the two platforms allowed the Army and later, the 
Marines, to maximize economies of scale in order to reduce costs (DoD, 2006).  
The LCCS concept represented a significant evolution from the original M270 MLRS 
strategy, according to which the majority of tasks (e.g. initial provisioning, inventory 
management, war reserve stock, repair and overhaul, depot maintenance, etc.) were 
provided with organic support (Reed & Reed, 2003).  LCCS, on the other hand, 
represents an ideal partnership, one in which the contractor assumes responsibility for 
providing technical support and user training in order to meet performance objectives 
while at the same time maximizing existing Army depot and acquisition infrastructure 
and relying on military personnel to operate the system (DoD, 2004).  
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By 2011, Lockheed Martin was supporting 620 Army and Marines fielded mobile 
launcher systems—396 HIMARS and 224 MLRS M270A1—via firm-fixed price with 
incentive fee1 contracts for stateside operations, and cost-plus fixed fee contracts for 
overseas contingency operations (Gardener, 2008). A third contract, in the amount of 
$158 million, termed Life Cycle Launcher Support (LCLS), extended HIMARS 
sustainment through December 2013 for services and through December 2014 for 
hardware. 
In June of 2013, the U.S. Army Contracting Command-Redstone posted a “special notice 
of proposed contract action” that, in effect, awarded Lockheed Martin the status of sole-
source provider for HIMARS sustainment. The Army wrote that  
“Lockheed Martin Corporation is the only source having the experience, 
expertise, and capability necessary to accomplish this effort. [Lockheed Martin’s] 
experience and technical expertise have been gained over a period of 31 years as 
the prime contractor responsible for the research, development, and production of 
the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launcher module and 
HIMARS/M270A1 fire control system.” (Army Contracting Command, 2013) 
Program Structure 
The Lockheed Martin LCCS/LCLS program office is headquartered in Dallas, where 
numerous program functions are executed including program management, depot repair 
coordination, inventory control, contracting with suppliers, design interface, and database 
maintenance (Discussion, 2013). The database tracks the location of each launcher, 
including each spare part, indicates whether the part is functional, and provides its status 
with regard to the repair process. The DoD’s internal logistics systems rarely achieve this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 FAR 16.2 establishes that a firm-fixed-price contract may be used in conjunction with incentives when the 




level of visibility, often leading to ordering redundancy, misplaced orders, and an 
incomplete picture of program operations. 
There are also 26 field service representatives (FSRs) that operate from 22 locations, 
eight of which are overseas. In-theater maintenance work is performed by soldiers with 
the assistance of these FSRs (Hawkins, 2009). These FSRs facilitate the supply process 
by overseeing numerous functions including: 
• supply, receipt, storage, issue, inspecting, packaging, and shipping, of subsystems 
and components; 
• data collection and recording (maintenance actions, supply transactions, operating 
hours, munitions status [deployment and garrison]); 
• system fault isolation using a variety of either built in or stand-alone test 
equipment; 
• replacement of assemblies, as required (see Figure 6); 
• provision of technical assistance and support (both launcher and automotive); and 
• provision of an interface for “reach back” engineering support, enabling the rapid 
resolution of problems. 
 
Given the level of sophistication provided by the Lockheed Martin’s database and 
logistics networks, the FSRs are able to streamline and simplify the repair process for 
launchers. As a result, early-on in the PBL program, Lockheed Martin was able to reduce 
the number of diagnostics devices provided to each battalion from six to one. In fact, 
soldiers operating the system in theater need only remove and replace defective 






Figure 6. Line replaceable units (LRUs) and assemblies provided by LCCS (Lockheed 
Martin, 2012). 
 
Perhaps one of the greatest benefits is the provision of limited depot-level repair 
capability at each battalion where repair work is provided by the FSR. Referred to as the 
capability to “Fix Forward,” some 50% of all HIMARS repairs are performed on location 
by the FSRs, eliminating wait times and significantly reducing costs. Moreover, the FSRs 
are trained to test and replace circuit card assemblies (CCAs), rather than the LRUs in 
which they are housed, which reduces the overall logistics footprint—only the CCAs 
need to be shipped—and lowers costs. This in-the-field repair capability has also 
significantly improved deployed launcher availability (Discussion, 2013).  
PBL Requirements  
Per the program’s performance-based agreement, the HIMARS PBL program measures 
performance in the following areas:  
• system readiness status;  
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• average response time for critical non-mission capable launcher failures in the 
continental United States and outside the continental United States;  
• average repair time in the field; and  
• average depot repair turnaround time (DoD, 2006).  
Note the relative simplicity of these requirements, which facilitated straightforward 
monitoring and, thus, complete transparency. The contract data requirements list also 
mandated that Lockheed Martin provide the following information; updated on a regular 
basis: 
• emergency action plan, 
• transition plan, 
• safety reports, 
• field weekly reports, and 
• field analysis reliability reports (DoD, 2006). 
Program Results 
Over the course of the last decade, The HIMARS PBL has repeatedly achieved and 
exceeded the performance requirements. Success was achieved early on. In submitting its 
list of critical accomplishments for consideration by the DoD Awards Program in 
Performance-Based Logistics in 2006, the Army’s program office noted that Lockheed 
Martin earned the maximum incentive fee each quarter for having achieved a 99% plus 
system readiness for every contract quarter (DoD, 2006).    
In addition, the critical accomplishments list noted the success of units deployed in 
support of the Global War on Terrorism. Between 2005 and 2006, HIMARS participated 
in multiple overseas operations, firing ninety-nine munitions, all of which hit their 
“specified, pinpoint targets. Moreover, no launcher was in a “down condition” for more 
than 24 hours since measurements began in April of 2005 (DoD, 2006). The award 
nomination also noted that “the outstanding performance by [Lockheed Martin] field 
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service representatives has proven that contractors on the battlefield are a viable solution 
to supporting modern ground weapon systems” (p. 4). The LCCS team won the Secretary 
of Defense Performance-Based Logistics Award in November of 2006.  
Based primarily on data collection provided by Lockheed Martin during the initial 
contract, the LCCS team was able to make a number of changes to the LCCS II contract 
that would reduce future ownership costs. Notably, the team determined that the usage 
hours for the launchers varied significantly between active Army units and National 
Guard units (DoD, 2009). In an effort to reduce future costs, the less-used units were 
categorized under a lower operational tempo, which led to a reduction in needed support. 
Accordingly, Lockheed Martin and the DoD negotiated the LCCS II contract to reflect 
the anticipated savings derived through the reduction in operational tempo. These savings 
turned out to be considerable. In 2007—the final year of LCCS I—costs associated with 
operational tempo totaled $12.4 million; in 2009 these costs had declined to $3.8 million, 
for a total cost avoidance of $8.6 million, a figure that was used to inform pricing for the 
subsequent contract (DoD, 2009).   
The LCCS II contract required that system readiness be maintained at or above 90% and 
that response time be below 48, 72, or 96 hours for U.S. based operations, depending on 
the nature of the problem, 92%, 91%, and 90% of the time, respectively (DoD, 2009). For 
overseas operations, the response time had to be below 96, 120, or 144 hours (DoD, 
2009). The program consistently achieved these objectives at the required percentages in 
all performance areas. As a result, the LCCS team won its second Secretary of Defense 
Performance-Based Logistics Award in 2009. 
PBL agreements incentivize suppliers to provide many unspecified functions in support 
of performance requirements. Some of these functions can be overlooked when support is 
provided through organic sources. For example, LCCS initiated a robust obsolescence 
management strategy early on in order to ensure that it could meet performance 
requirements (DoD, 2006). Lockheed Martin regularly monitors the Government-
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Industry Data Exchange Program in order to identify potential obsolescence issues. 
Within the first couple years of the PBL, LCCS evaluated the potential for the 
obsolescence of numerous components, identified alternate parts, and supported specific 
redesign efforts (DoD, 2006). Although a natural extension of the PBL strategy, 
obsolescence management has proven challenging under other contracting or in-house 
arrangements. 
As mentioned, the HIMARS program also tracks reliability through mandated field 
analysis reports, monitoring the mean time between system aborts (MTBSA) and mean 
time between essential function failure (MTBEFF).  Figure 7 illustrates the reliability 
improvements in the Army units’ reliability between 2005 and 2012, which have been 
built into the HIMARS system in order to better meet the stated performance goals 
(Discussion, 2013; Lockheed Martin, 2012).  
 
Figure 7. HIMARS reliability over time (Lockheed Martin, 2012) 
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Notably, the failures have declined across the entire HIMARS system.  Figure 8 shows 
the number of failures for 25 HIMARS parts during a twelve year period early-on in the 
program compared to a period of twelve months spanning the latter part of 2011 into 
2012. On average the number of failures has decreased by about 71% (Discussion, 2013; 
Lockheed Martin, 2012). 
 
Figure 8. Number of yearly failures for 25 HIMARS parts, early in program (left) and more 





The HIMARS experience makes it clear that when properly implemented, PBL strategies 
can result in reduced costs and continuously-improving performance. The HIMARS PBL 
strategy worked to ensure that incentives were carefully structured and aligned with the 
performance requirements of the system. With the incentives aligned, integration between 
the provider and customer was readily achieved. The support provider, appropriately 
empowered, was able to work to improve logistics efficiency, improve performance, 
reduce costs, and make reliability improvements that reduce life cycle costs, resulting in a 
win-win for both customer and provider. 
We have identified a number of the HIMARS program’s attributes which we believe can 
inform future PBL programs, thereby helping to ensure their success:  
Alignment of contractor incentives with system and mission performance requirements. 
It is critical that the PBL incentives be carefully structured and aligned with the 
mission performance requirements of the system. With the incentives aligned, 
integration between the provider and customer is generally improved. The support 
provider, appropriately empowered, can then work to improve logistics efficiency, 
improve performance, reduce costs, and make reliability improvements that reduce 
life cycle costs—this results in a win-win for both customer and provider. 
Clearly-defined performance metrics  
Performance metrics, rooted in a performance-based agreement, provides a clear and 
objective way to measure the progress of the support provider. The agreement should 
specify a range of support to accommodate changing priorities and resources 
available, and therefore give flexibility to the derived metrics. The metrics need to be 




A total life-cycle systems management perspective 
A life-cycle based perspective will improve reliability and maintainability, and better 
manage costs. Planning for, resourcing, and executing the design, acquisition, 
management, and fielding of an integrated product demands that both DoD and 
private-sector managers manage systems across time, rather than at a single point in 
time. Longer-term PBL contracts can incentivize the adoption of such a perspective.  
Supply chain management  
Material support is a critical link in the supportability of weapon systems.  The best 
skilled labor, advanced technology, and high performance mean little without the 
“right part, at the right place, at the right time.” Supply chain management is an area 
where the commercial sector has developed superior capabilities, and is a primary 
target for incorporation into PBL implementation.  
Public-private partnerships  
It is essential to achieve the right public-private mix for each program; with clearly 
defined and measurable expectations.  In addition to satisfying the statutory 
requirements, using the strengths of the organic and contractor organizations can 
provide a better logistics solution. Public-private partnerships enable the compliance 
with statutory requirements, preclude the investment in redundant capabilities, and 
yet still maintain single point accountability. 
Operational requirements and funding pressures are driving the need for logistics 
transformation. PBLs often require government organizations to shift their focus and to 
perform tasks that are different from their traditional tasks.  There is, however, a natural 
cultural inertia that resists these, sometimes dramatic, changes. For example, legacy 
sustainment processes generally involve writing lengthy, detailed design specifications 
and statements of work, which reference many military specifications, as well as contract 
terms and conditions, and attempt to be so comprehensive that they cover every possible 
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contingency. With PBLs, defense organizations are no longer writing these detailed 
specifications, but have had to learn how to write performance-based specifications.  
Needless-to-say, a successful logistics transformation will require a sustained leadership 
commitment to change the existing culture and have it embrace the new organizational 
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